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Abstract
The “great divergence” in incomes between Europe and the rest of the world
occurred relatively recently. Why was it that Western Europe, once a backward
outpost on the fringes of the Eurasian continent, able to dominate in terms of
income and technology the previously successful Eastern economies? Several
mechanisms have been identiÞed to account for the rise of Europe. This paper formalizes one important mechanism, the intellectual origins of which can
be traced back to Hume and Weber and which was fully, though informally,
articulated by E.L. Jones. This mechanism emphasizes the contrast between
the European states-system and the Eastern empires. Political competition
for a mobile tax-base in a states-system forces rulers to expropriate less from
their subjects and to supply relatively more “public services”. By eﬀectively
limiting the “exit” options of the ruled, an empire rewards its ruler with a
captive tax-base that can be subjected to relatively higher levels of expropriation without a similar rise in “public services” provided. The states-system
thus encourages higher levels of capital accumulation, while the empire stißes
it. The successes of the Eastern empires in their consolidation phase are due
to the competition they initially faced from neighboring states. Since Europe
escaped such consolidation, the process of accumulation there never faced the
impediments its Eastern counterparts did. The paper, thus, also provides a
structural explanation for the emergence of institutions in Europe that led to
relatively secure property rights.
∗
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Introduction

Before the industrial revolution income diﬀerentials among broad geographic entities and
main civilizations, such as Western Europe, India, or China, were quite small, of the
order of 1.0 to 1.3 or even less according to one recent estimate (Bairoch, 1993). Yet, by
the nineteenth century, Western Europe, that comparatively small and once-backward
outpost on the fringes of the Eurasian continental mass, emerged as the technologically
most advanced and dynamic region with a clear lead in terms of per capita income.
Why?
The rise of Europe seems even more puzzling when compared with the potential displayed particularly by China as late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Many
elements that appear to have contributed to the economic success of Europe seem to be
present in China from comparatively early times onwards. For instance, on the eve of
the European Renaissance, Chinese advances in science and technology were superior to
those of Europe (see Needham, 1954 and Mokyr, 1990); Chinese commercialization and
urbanization levels were impressive by premodern standards; the use of paper currency
and credit institutions in China predates that of Europe; investment in infrastructure
(highways, the ‘grand canals’, irrigation projects) and the use of standardized weights
and measures facilitated the emergence of domestic markets in both luxury and agricultural commodities, with peasants trading considerable fractions of their produce; a
rural based proto-industrialization system in China mirrored that of Europe until the
nineteenth century (Wong, 1997, Deng, 2000, Pomeranz, 2000).
To see what is involved it is useful to start with one prominent attempt to grapple
with this question, that of Braudel (1979) who argues that the “capitalist process” could
only develop under certain conditions, namely (i) a vigorous and expanding market
economy; (ii) an environment which favors the survival of dynastic households allowing
for sustained accumulation of wealth; and (iii) openness to foreign trade. China, the
countries of Islam and India had a proliferation of markets and merchants. But, Braudel
contends, in their own ways states in these societies eﬀectively controlled the process
of wealth accumulation, punishing or taxing those who had obtained excessive wealth.
Thus, Braudel concludes, it was the “totalizing tyranny” of the Chinese system and
the “tyranny of an arbitrary prince” in the Ottoman Empire and Mughal India that
prevented the process of patient wealth accumulation necessary for any further historical
development.
Europe, in contrast, appears to have provided an environment that did not put up
1

insuperable barriers to the gradual and continuous accumulation of wealth by successive
generations that characterized the “industrious revolution” of the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries.1 This, in turn, paved the way for the industrial revolution and the “great
divergence” between Europe and the other major economies.
What was it then that made it possible for this environment to emerge in Europe allowing it to avoid the fates of the eastern empires? In what follows, I clarify and formalize
one popular argument that identiÞes what I will call the Hume-Weber-Jones mechanism
to help explain this “European miracle”.2 Its most clear contemporary formulation can
be found in the following statements of E.L. Jones.
“The answer is a compound of processes, but what stands out is that the
rulers of the relatively small European states learned that by supplying the
services of order and adjudication they could attract and retain the most and
best-paying constituents-for their subjects must be thought of as constituents
in some degree. Within each state there was a clash between kingly interest
in taxes and noble preoccupation with rents, an unsettled competition in
which the royal concern oﬀered the peasantry some faint protection and some
provision of justice. Competition among states led later to programmes of
services. Once more there was an environmental component, since, had the
core areas of their states been larger and richer, kings might have felt less
inspired to oﬀer as much as they did in return for taxes (it was little, but
in the very long-term it was enough to make European history special).”
(Jones, 1981, p. 233.)
“Europeans lived in relatively small states and if they were badly treated–
over-taxed, expropriated, or threatened with worse—it was physically possible
for them to slip away over a frontier into a more tolerant country. This was
not possible in anything like the same degree for merchants or entrepreneurs
sealed, as it were, within the great Asian empires.” (Jones, 2002, p. 28.)
Thus, an environment favorable to the accumulation of (both physical and human)
capital surfaced in Europe because the political division of the continent that led to a
states-system limited the ability of the rulers to expropriate their subjects who found
1

On this now commonly-held view that the Industrial Revolution was a rather slow and gradual
movement in its aggregate measures with a long preparatory era preceding it, see de Vries (1994) and
O’Brian (1993).
2
Section 6 below provides a short intellectual history of this mechanism.
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that “exit” was not prohibitively costly in the presence of neighboring rulers competing
for “tax” bases.3 Furthermore, facing competition, the European rulers were compelled
to adopt policies that promoted the interests of their rising mercantile classes. The
Eastern empires, however, at least after their consolidation, did not face the kind of
inter-state competition in which the European states found themselves engaged.4 The
rulers of these empires were, therefore, not as compelled as their European counterparts
to sustain an economic environment necessary for the accumulation of capital that characterized the long preparatory period before the industrial revolution.5 These empires,
of course, were not based on predation alone, nor was it the case that they did not
oﬀer anything in return for what they collected from their subjects. It would otherwise
be impossible to explain their early successes, their near-parity with Europe before the
Industrial revolution, or their sheer survival for centuries. For instance, the rulers of
both the Ottoman and Mughal empires were inheritors of the near-eastern and islamic
concepts of statecraft modiÞed by the Turco-Mongol traditions of Central Asia that
linked the power of a state to the prosperity of its subjects. One formulation of this
tradition that goes back to sixth century states that “with justice and moderation the
people will produce more, tax revenues will increase, and the state will grow rich and
powerful. Justice is the foundation of a powerful state.”6 Justice, in this conception of
state, meant, most importantly, prevention of what the rulers viewed as illegal taxation
(Inalcik, 2000). Rulers of the Eastern empires, not unlike their European counterparts,
3

Wallerstein (1979) and Braudel (1979) argue that China, India, and Europe have historically been
world-economies: “economically autonomous” geographical areas “able to provide for most of their
needs.”
4
It is instructive to note that the states that eventually formed these empires oﬀered lower tax and
expropriation rates to potential subjects in the process of consolidation. The ßedgling Ottoman state,
for example, imposed taxes that were generally lower than its Balkan and middle-eastern neighbors it
eventually conquered (Inalcik 2000). Taxes in seventeenth century India steadily rose from their base
established initially by Akbar (Hodgson, 1974).
5
For instance, “[i]n the Ottoman case, the main concern was always for the Þscal interests of the state
and the protection of consumers in the internal market, while in the mercantilist [European] economies
economic regulations were determined by a competitive international market. In the last analysis, the
rift is linked to the contrast between a social structure which is controlled by an authoritarian ruler
in an estate society and a civil society in which the class system and the participation in power of
the rising bourgeois class prevailed...Also it is to be remembered that, for the Ottomans, wealth was
expected to derive from new tax resources in the lands annexed by conquest, not by intensive methods
such as maximizing the income from agriculture, industries, and commerce through new technologies”
(Inalcik, 1994, p. 51).
6
Quoted in Inalcik (2000), p. 66.
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also provided public services: they invested in infrastructure, irrigation and drainage
projects, maintained roads and caravanserais, adopted policies to encourage agricultural
production, tried to provide a working judicial system as well as peace and security (Raychaudhuri, 1982, Inalcik and Quataert, 1994, Wong, 1997). However, in comparison to
what they took what these rulers provided was, relatively speaking, too little.7 The differences between them and the European rulers might at times have seemed small but,
compounded over centuries, even small diﬀerences in the resulting rates of accumulation
and growth would lead to large diﬀerences in incomes.8
The thesis that the states-system of Europe promoted capital accumulation and
growth by forcing rulers to treat their footloose subjects more gingerly than their counterparts trapped in the vastness of the eastern empires is the focus of this paper. The
question “Why Europe” has been the focus of a vast informal historical literature that
has put forward additional mechanisms which I brießy outline and critically discuss in
Section 5 below. The Þrst of these, which I refer to as the “Culture Makes Almost All
the Diﬀerence” theory (see Landes, 1998 and 2000), emphasizes the role of cultural differences in explaining the path taken by diﬀerent economies. The second thesis is that
put forward by a group of historians called the “world historians” who believe Europe’s
rise was due to some “chance” event (see Goldstone, 2000 and Pomeranz, 2000, Wong,
1997) . The third is the “Resource Grab” thesis most recently advocated by Frank
(1998) that focuses on the European seizure of gold and silver in the New World. These
mechanisms, I argue below, may have had some short-run eﬀects, but ultimately they
7

Thus, “[i]n constructing dams, canals, or artiÞcial ponds for irrigation, the Ottoman state took
the initiative only in some urgent cases, and private participation in such enterprises was encouraged
mainly for the tax revenues to be gained. In contrast, as argued by economic historians, in Europe, the
relatively small-sized state structures, Þercely in rivalry against each other, and also population pressure,
led the Europeans to intensive agriculture and to systematic eﬀorts for mercantile gains from foreign
trade as well as the more intensive use of labor at home” (Inalcik, 1994, p. 51). Wong draws attention to
the contrast between the support provided by the European rulers to mercantile interests and the lack
thereof in the case of China: “[i]rrespective of the particular institutional mechanisms deployed by a
particular European country’s merchants, all held a fundamental belief that state and merchant shared
a common interest in exploiting economic opportunities. European notions of a merchant empire were
absent from Chinese thinking not because the Chinese state was too weak to consider such an alliance
between government and merchant but because it was too strong and successful in other ways to have
reason to consider practices that would bring it revenue that it did not anxiously desire and potential
problems it did not really want” (Wong, 2000 p.455). And “[t]he Chinese political economy was not
‘mercantilist’ since its policymakers did not conceive of themselves as competing for wealth and power
with other like-minded governments” (ibid, p. 460).
8
See Section 4 below on historical evidence of relative expropriation rates.
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are not convincing as independent factors that can explain the contrasts between the
long-run growth experience of Europe and the economies of the Orient.
Formal literature on the subject is as yet small. Most important for our purposes is
Garner and Chaudhry (2001) that formulates a mechanism complementary to the one
suggested in this paper, emphasizing the growth-promoting role of the states system:
rulers that blocked technological change ran the risk of losing, at least partially, their
possessions and revenue to neighbors who did. Since the risks were smaller for the
rulers of empires who did not always face such menacing competitors close by, support
for change was not as forthcoming in an empire.9 Interstate competition in Europe is
also stressed by Findlay (1992) who points out that this rivalry promoted advances in
military technology that enabled Europe to extract resources from the rest of the world.10
An intriguing recent formal literature (see, inter alia, Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor
and Mountford (2003)) looks at the connection between the demographic transition from
the Malthusian to post-Malthusian regime and the industrial revolution, an issue ignored
here. This literature, in turn, abstracts from the political-economy issues and assumes
that accumulated human capital is directly channelled into productive activities rather
than rent seeking—an activity that has historically been quite dominant as the example
of Chinese mandarins illustrates. A historically more accurate and richer account of the
“great divergence” would therefore beneÞt from an analysis that combines the political
economic concerns with this recent literature on endogenous population growth.11
The mechanism emphasized in the paper, namely competition for a mobile tax base
and the eﬀect of this on tax rates, has been studied extensively in the literature.12
9

A related paper is Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a) that emphasizes the willingness of political
elites to block innovation when they fear this would lead to their loss of political power. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2002a) show that external threats may reduce incentives to block economic development.
The concern of these papers is to explain the experience of European late-comers, like Austria-Hungary
and Russia, to industrialization. Garner and Chaudhry (2001) uses the mechanism in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000a) in a growth setting with an explicit focus on the states system and the political
competition it fosters.
10
The phrase in the title of this paper that aptly summarizes the mechanism involved also comes
from Findlay (1992). Tilly (1990) emphasizes the role of interstate competition in determining the type
of political institutions that eventually emerged in Europe.
11
Mokyr (2002) emphasizes the historical importance of political economic concerns for the process
of human capital accumulation.
12
See, for example, Epple and Romer (1991), who present a static closed-economy model where exit,
that is the mobility of factors (á la Tiebout, 1956) subject to taxation, limits the extent of redistribution.
Persson and Tabellini (1995) survey the literature on optimal taxation when the tax base is mobile
internationally.
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An earlier strand argued that cooperation among benevolent governments would have
them setting capital taxes in accordance with some version of a Ramsey rule. Without
cooperation, tax rates would be ineﬃciently low as governments/jurisdictions compete
to attract the mobile capital in an attempt to form a larger tax base (see Gordon, 1983,
among others). A more recent literature, as exempliÞed by Rogoﬀ (1985) and Kehoe
(1989), showed that when benevolent governments face credibility problems, cooperation
among them would push the tax rate above the optimal level. The noncooperative
equilibrium with tax competition would bring taxes closer to the optimum without,
however, reducing them all the way down to the optimum. The model presented in
this paper diﬀers from this literature in a number of ways. First, the assumption of
benevolent governments common to all of the existing literature is abandoned: rulers in
what follows are purely self-interested. The problem here is not, therefore, the issues that
arise when benevolent governments try to manipulate the expectations of the agents for
their own beneÞt as in the existing literature. Rather, what surfaces in what follows is the
conßict of distributional interests among the rulers and the ruled and its consequences
for tax/expropriation rates. Second, we examine a long-run growth model, while the
literature is typically at best only quasi-dynamic, restricting its attention at most to
two-period setups. Third, we show that tax competition, even when governments cannot
credibly commit, may force them to adopt tax policies that attain the Þrst-best.
This paper also stands at the crossroads of several strands of recent literature on
political economy. To see clearly its connection to this literature, note that the mechanism speciÞed in the paper relies on two building blocks. First, there exist a number of
agents (called the “ruler(s)” and the “subjects” here) and these agents have conßicting
interests because wealth can be expropriated (or one can say redistributed to the extent
that expropriation is legitimized through the political process). Secondly, under certain
conditions it is possible for “subjects” to “exit”. Recent political economy literature has
analyzed the consequences of the adoption of various strategies by agents as they try
to expropriate others or to defend themselves against expropriation. In in his account
of the rise of England in the 18th century and the United States in the 19th and early
20th centuries, Weingast (1995) argues that the crucial factor that generated economic
expansion in both cases was political competition among jurisdictions (which he labels
“market-preserving federalism”) for the mobile capital and labor because this competition limited the ability of the state to conÞscate wealth.13 Recent common property
13

Weingast (1995) Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1996) also point out the fundamental role played
by “federalism” in the remarkable growth performance of China over the past two decades. North, Sum-
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models of growth (see, for example, Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996, Lane and Tornell,
1996) focus on the negative eﬀects of conßict among social groups on growth as they
attempt to expropriate resources from each other. In Grossman and Kim (1996) agents
adopt a “voice” strategy, namely arming themselves to the teeth against potential predators/expropriators.14 Another historically important alternative strategy is insurrection
or revolt that, if successful, results in the expropriation of the rulers by their subjects
(see Grossman, 1991). Thus, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) argue cogently that the
extension of the franchise in the West was a response to the threat of revolution. Democracy was necessary because the only safeguard for sustained redistribution desired by
the masses was possession of political power. This link between political power and the
redistribution of wealth it aﬀords those who happen to command such power has been
used in a number of diﬀerent contexts. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002a) exploit this link
to argue that political elites may block technological and institutional developments for
fear that it would lead to loss of political power, which would then translate into an
economic loss. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), among others, point out that in majoritarian
democracies, which give the median voter the decisive political power, this power could
be used to redistribute wealth. To the extent that such redistribution has to be carried out by distortionary taxation, this would lower the rate of growth of the economy.
There exist also a number of studies that examine the role redistribution and factor
mobility plays in determining the size and number of nations in static settings. Bolton
and Roland (1997), for example, study the question of the break-up or union of two
regions in a voting equilibrium. One result they obtain that is relevant to the analysis
in this paper is their Þnding that with perfect mobility of factors, the two countries in
their setup must oﬀer the same tax and public goods package even when agents diﬀer
in their preferences.15 Other papers relevant to the issues raised here include McGuire
merhill, and Weingast (2000) and Nugent and Robinson (2001) emphasize the importance of political
competition for the growth performance of a number of Latin American countries.
14
In their empirical investigation of the importance of institutions, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)
Þnd that institutions which protect citizens against expropriation have a Þrst order eﬀect on long-run
economic growth.
15
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) analyze the solution of a world planner in determining the size and
number of nations under diﬀerent political systems. They show that the planner would choose to
have fewer nations than in the decentralized democratic equilibrium. In a diﬀerent setting, Bolton and
Roland (1997) also show that democratic voting with the possibility of secession may lead to too many
nations. Intuitively, both results rely on the (implicit) negative externalities associated with secessions.
Obviously, the advantages of having multiple states in contrast to one large state (empire) emphasized
in this paper, relies on the eﬃciency of the former in limiting expropriation. A related literature,
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and Olson (1996) that demonstrates that even rulers with monopoly power would limit
the expropriation of their immobile subjects and provide public goods to stimulate production and, thus, the expansion of their tax base.16 The role played by the provision
of public goods in economic growth is the focus of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and
Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) among others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment, which is
represented in its basics by an economy in which a ruler that monopolizes political power
expropriates income from his subjects. In return, the ruler provides “public services”
that enhance the productivity of the producers. In Section 3, I Þrst show that even
when the ruled have no means of “exit” as in an empire, the “encompassing interest”
of the ruler leads him to restrict expropriation and provide a certain level of public
services. Rulers that discount the future at higher rates, that have lower intertemporal
elasticities of substitution and that inhabit relatively less productive economies are then
shown to expropriate more. Rulers in economies where public services contribute more
to the productivity of their subjects also tend to provide more of such services. In a
states system where the ruled have the option of exit, political competition for paying
subjects is then shown to lead to a lower expropriation rate and a higher growth rate
than that obtains in an empire. This would then provide a structural explanation for
the early successes of the Ottomans, Mughals, and the Song Chinese as they initially
found themselves in competition with neighbors. The consolidation of these countries
into empires would stiße growth later on. Since Europe was spared such consolidation,
the emerging states system forced rulers to reduce the rates of expropriation relative
to public services provided. The “privileges” obtained by the European subjects were
gradually institutionalized giving rise to more secure property rights and allowed for
rates of growth and eventually levels of income that exceeded the ones attained in the
eastern empires where subjects were never able to obtain the political power to protect
their rights. I brießy discuss the available historical evidence concerning mobility and
tax/expropriation levels in Section 4. Alternative hypotheses for the rise of Europe
are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, I provide a short intellectual history of the
Hume-Weber-Jones mechanism. The last section concludes the paper.

including most importantly Findlay (1996) and Grossman and Mendoza (2001), studies the economics
of the formation of empires, an issue that is complementary to the analysis in this paper.
16
For a similar formalized argument see Findlay and Wilson (1987).
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2

The Environment

I use a simple dynamic model to illustrate the main points. An economy consists of
two types of agents, a ruler and his subject households.17 The subjects produce a good
that can be used for consumption and investment. The ruler appropriates a portion of
the good produced and in return may choose to supply public services that enhance the
productivity of his subjects. I start by discussing the role and nature of these public
services.

2.1

Productive “Public Services”

Each subject household i in economy j has access to a production technology summarized
by
yij = αkij f (Gj /Y j ),

f (0) = 0, f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0,

(1)

where yij is the quantity of the composite good produced by household i, α is a positive
constant, kij is the stock of “capital”18 that the subject household has in its possession,
R
f is a function that depends on the total output of the economy Y j = yij di, and
Gj ≥ 0 denotes the amount of public good provided by the ruler of economy j. The
formulation of the function f (·) reßects three considerations: (i) the higher is the level
of public services provided, the more productive is each producer; (ii) the provision of
public services is essential for “social order” and for production so that if the ruler fails
to provide such services no production can take place (f (0) = 0); and (iii) typically the
provision of public services such as security, adjudication, irrigation works, roads, and
17

By endowing each economy with a unique ruler, I abstract from a number of issues that arise when
the administration of an economy is carried out by a political class whose members do not necessarily
share the same interests. Conßicts among the members of this class have typically taken political,
military and economic shades in both the empires of the East and Europe and raise a number of
interesting issues which will not be treated below. See Usher (1992) for a formal economic treatment
of some of these issues.
18
I interpret the “capital stock” k as a composite having physical and human capital components.
It is straightforward to show that under certain conditions a model with both types capital can be
formulated as in (1) (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, pp. 144-146). I also interpret human capital
as a “comprehensive stock of all knowledge” and human capital accumulation as including research,
development, and invention. In this I follow Lucas (2002) who questions the usefulness and empirical
validity of the models that interpret “human capital” as “schooling” and, thus, need to add a second
state variable called “blueprints” to account for all sources of productivity growth.
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waterways is subject to congestion, i.e. the public service is rival but not excludable.19
For a given amount of public services Gj , the quantity of the service available for each
user falls as more users take advantage of the services provided. Thus, in (1) we have
an increase in Y j for given Gj reducing the level of public services available to each
producer as well as leading to a decline in the output yij of each producer.20 Note for
future reference that had there, unrealistically, been no congestion in the provision of
public services, the resulting growth rate would display scale eﬀects.
Equation (1) also implies that the output of an individual producer is subject to
constant returns to the private capital, provided that the ruler maintains a constant
level of public services to total output, that is a constant level of congestion.
I now turn to the description of the problem faced by subject households.

2.2

The Subjects

Subjects are inÞnitely-lived dynastic families. Each family i residing in economy j
chooses its consumption cji to maximize its lifetime welfare Uij given by
Ui =

Z

0

∞

u(cji,t )e−ρt dt,

subject to the budget constraint21

(cji,t )1−θ − 1
u(ci,t ) =
1−θ

cji + kú ij = (1 − τ j )yij

(2)

(3)

where τ j is the constant rate at which the ruler expropriates income. Henceforth, for
simplicity I shall call τ j the tax rate with the understanding that this need not coincide
with the legal tax rate (legitimized by whatever political mechanism that may exist).
This is important because, as the examples cited in the Section 4 suggest, extra-legal
expropriation historically played an important role in the transfer of income from the
ruled to the ruler.22
19

Note that G is a ßow, so that the right interpretation say, for roads, would be total mileage per
year, etc.
20
For a thorough analysis of this and other formulations as well as their implications, see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000).
21
In what follows I drop the time subscripts except where there is risk of confusion.
22
Historically, of course, everywhere more than one agent taxed the producer and not every tax
demanded by every collector was “legal”. I simplify by assuming that there exists one ruler per economy.
However, allowing for other expropriators will not change the conclusions regarding the contrast between
an empire and a states system and adds nothing to understanding the basic mechanisms involved in
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An economy j starts life with a continuum of subjects whose mass is N j . The subjects
may choose to change the location of their residence, which coincides with the location
of their productive activities. Changing a location is taken to imply migration from
one economy to another. Subjects migrate, taking their capital with them, if doing so
improves their welfare. Subjects who migrate incur a one-time migration cost ξ ≥ 0.

2.3

Rulers

Each economy is ruled by one inÞnitely-lived ruler. Rulers derive utility from consumption. They also derive an additional beneÞt from ruling an economy with a minimum
number, N̄ > 0, of inhabitants. We suppose that this is the minimum number required,
inter alia, to sustain, for instance, an army to ensure the survival of the country and its
ruler as independent entities. Formally,
Urj

=

Z

0

∞

u(cjr,t )e−ρt dt

j

+ Ω(N ),

(cjr,t )1−θ − 1
u(cr,t ) =
,
1−θ


 ∆ > 0 if N j ≥ N̄ > 0
Ω(N j ) =
,

0 if N j < N̄

(4)

where the subscript r indicates a ruler and the function Ω(N j ) captures the additional
beneÞts a ruler enjoys when the economy has at least N̄ subjects.23
From subjects residing and producing in economy j its ruler collects tax revenues
τ Y j of which he uses a fraction (1 − µj ) to Þnance the provision of public goods; thus,
Gj = (1 − µj )τ j Y j . The rest is employed for the ruler’s consumption; thus cj = µj τ j Y j .
j

3

The Analysis

I now turn to the description of equilibrium Þrst in an empire and secondly in a system
of states.
that contrast.
23
The only role this additional beneÞt plays in the analysis that follows is to ensure that a ruler that
chooses the optimal tax and appropriation rates is never indiﬀerent between that choice and that of
adopting policies that lead to the loss of all his subjects.
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3.1

The Empire

An empire for our purposes is an economy from which its inhabitants Þnd it impossible
to emigrate. Formally, an empire is an economy where the migration cost ξ → ∞. Thus,
the ruler of the empire Þnds himself with a subject population on which taxes can be
imposed without fear of losing at least some of them to a rival ruler. The problem that
confronts such a ruler is to determine (1) the level of the proportional tax to be imposed
upon his subjects and (2) the fraction of the tax revenue that can be used to Þnance the
ruler’s consumption. An increase in the tax rate has two contradictory consequences.
On the one hand, it reduces the rate of return on investment and, thus, lowers the rate of
capital accumulation by his subjects. This depresses future output and future revenues
that can be appropriated by the ruler. On the other hand, given the existing capital
stock, a higher tax rate yields, ceteris paribus, more tax revenue, enabling the ruler to
supply a higher quantity of the public good. This, in turn, increases both the output
and the rate of return on investment.
Formally, to solve the problem confronting the ruler of the empire, we start by
describing the behavior of the households facing given τ and µ (thus, a given quantity
of the public good relative to total output).24 Households maximize their utility given
in (2) subject to (1) and (3), facing an after tax rate of return on capital equal to
(1 − τ )αf (G/Y ). It is straightforward to show that given constant τ and µ, the choices
of the households yield growth rates for consumption, capital, and output all equal to
the same constant g given by
g = (1/θ) {(1 − τ )αf [(1 − µ)τ ] − ρ} .

(5)

Given our restrictions on the function f(·), this growth rate initially rises with the
tax rate τ at low values and falls with it as τ keeps rising, reßecting the trade-oﬀs
mentioned above. The value of τ that maximizes the growth rate g is implicitly given
by (1 − τ )(1 − µ)f 0 [(1 − µ)τ ] = f[(1 − µ)τ ]. Since a higher rate of consumption µ reduces
the amount of public good supplied by the ruler, it lowers the growth rate.
The welfare of an individual household, given this constant growth rate, (1), (2), and
(3) can be expressed as
−1

Ui = (1 − θ)
24

"

#

1−θ
ki,0
1
−
,
ρ − g(1 − θ) ρ

dUi
> 0.
dg

(6)

In this section I drop the economy superscripts j because we are concerned with a single country.
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Thus, the welfare of an individual household depends positively on the growth rate g.25
Turning now to the problem faced by the ruler, we Þrst observe that since his consumption is given by c = µτ Y it also grows at the common constant rate g given
time-invariant choices for τ and µ. His lifetime welfare is hence given by
Ur = (1 − θ)
R

−1

"

#

c1−θ
1
r,0
−
+ Ω(N),
ρ − g(1 − θ) ρ

cr,0 = µτ aK0 f [(1 − µ)τ ]

(7)

where K0 = ki,0 di is the aggregate initial capital stock. The ruler uses the instruments
at his disposal, τ and µ to maximize his lifetime welfare. The Þrst-order conditions for
his maximization problem can be expressed (with π ∈ {τ , µ}) as
∂Ur /∂π = Λ {[ρ − g(1 − θ)] (∂cr,0 /∂π) + cr,0 (∂g/∂π)} = 0,

−2
Λ ≡ c−θ
r,0 [ρ − g(1 − θ)]
(8)

where
∂cr,0 /∂τ = (µ/f ) Y0 [f (·) + (1 − µ)τ f 0 (·)] > 0,
∂cr,0 /∂µ = (ατ K0 ) [f(·) − µτ f 0 (·)] ,

∂g/∂τ = (α/θ) [(1 − µ)(1 − τ )f 0 (·) − f (·)]

∂g/∂µ = − (α/θ) (1 − τ )τ f 0 (·) < 0.

From (8) we can immediately derive a number of conclusions. First, note that since
∂Ur /∂τ = 0 for optimality and since ∂cr,0 /∂τ > 0, the choice of τ by the ruler here
implies that ∂g/∂τ < 0. That is, the optimal tax rate for the ruler of the empire is not
the one that maximizes the growth rate. One consequence of this is that the growth
rate that results from the ruler’s choice is not the one that maximizes the welfare of his
subjects. To see this recall from (6) above that a subject household’s lifetime welfare
depends positively on the growth rate. Thus, the growth rate that would be optimal
for this household is the maximum one that the economy can attain.26 The growth rate
chosen by the ruler is, however, less than this maximum. Further, given the relationship
between the growth and tax rates discussed above, it is easy to see that the tax rate is
higher than the one that would be chosen by a benevolent ruler that seeks to maximize
the welfare of his subjects. Second, observe that since ∂Ur /∂µ = 0 for optimality and
25

In (6) the sign of the partial derivative follows from ρ − g(1 − θ) > 0 which is required for the
transversality condition to hold.
26
This would not in general be the case. It is true here because of the functional forms used. Allowing
for more general cases neither aﬀects the main conclusions of the paper nor does it add any signiÞcant
new insights about the mechanisms formalized.
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since ∂g/∂µ < 0, the choice of µ by the ruler implies that ∂cr,0 /∂µ > 0. Now with
the restrictions imposed on f(·), cr,0 = 0 when µ = 0 and cr,0 = 0 when µ → 1,
we have cr,0 increasing at low levels of µ and decreasing at higher values of µ. These
considerations imply that the ruler chooses a rate of consumption µ that is less than the
rate that would maximize his initial consumption cr,0 . Clearly, this is the case because
of intertemporal considerations. Though a higher µ makes it possible to enjoy higher
current consumption, it lowers the growth rate and thus the future consumption of the
ruler. Finally (8) implies the familiar condition for eﬃciency
dY
f 0 (·)
=
= 1.
dG
f(·) + τ (1 − µ)f 0 (·)

(9)

Thus, the ruler chooses the level of G such that the marginal beneÞt, dY /dG, of public
services provided equals its marginal cost in terms of output foregone (which is one unit).
Note that the equation in (9) implicitly yields a unique value for τ (1 − µ) = Y /G that
only depends on the properties of the function f (·) and nothing else. One consequence
of this is that changes in the underlying structure of the economy that lead to alterations
in the optimum level of the tax rate τ would necessarily be accompanied by changes in
µ of the same sign.
To see how the tax and consumption rates are aﬀected by this structure start by
focusing on the parameter a that measures the productivity of capital (see (1)) given
public services. As the calibration-simulation example summarized in Table 1 shows
rulers in more productive economies tax less and retain a lower fraction µ of tax receipts for their private consumption.27 Intuitively, in a more productive economy where
investment has a higher rate of return, the ruler is better oﬀ encouraging private investment by expropriating less in exchange for higher future consumption. The ruler
also keeps a lower fraction of the tax proceeds for his consumption because the public
services he provides are more productive as well. Note that given the unique level for
τ (1 − µ) = Y /G the lower tax rate raises the growth rate of the economy.
Table 1
a 0.1 0.5 1
2
3
τ 0.85 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.34
µ 0.61 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.03
One question the historical literature raises is the eﬀect of changes in the rate at
which the ruling classes—here consolidated into one ruler—discount their future. It has
27

The baseline values of the parameters in the following examples are K0 = 2, ρ = 0.03, θ = 0.99,
δ = 0.02, a = 1, f(·) = [(1 − µ)τ ]β with β = 0.5.
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been argued, for instance, that intensiÞed dynastic struggles in certain periods made
sultans and emperors short-sighted. On the other hand, high-ranking oﬃcials found
their tenures frequently cut short by emperors fearful of the rise of rival power-holders.
This tended to make these oﬃcials in turn less concerned with a future they may not
live to enjoy. This issue of a higher average rate of time preference for the rulers can
be studied here by decoupling the ruler’s rate of time preference from that of the ruled.
The results of this straightforward exercise are summarized in a simulation example in
Table 2 which shows that as expected a higher rate of time preference ν for the ruler
tends to make him tax more and retain a higher proportion µ of the tax receipts for his
own consumption. This lowers the growth rate of the economy and the welfare of his
subjects.
Table 2
ν 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
τ 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43
µ 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.23
A similar issue also arises in the historical literature regarding the subjects. As
the examples cited in Section 4 suggest, rulers in eastern empires tended also to be
less careful about the life and limb of their subjects. This would make these subjects
discount the future, which may at any time be cut short, at a higher rate ρ. The eﬀect
of such higher levels of ρ on the choices of the ruler is summarized in the numerical
example in Table 3 which shows that both µ and the tax rate τ is higher for those rulers
whose subjects discount the future at higher levels. However, the rise in both µ and τ
is less signiÞcant as compared to the previous case.
Table 3
ρ 0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
τ 0.3794 0.3796 0.3798 0.3799
µ 0.1215 0.1219 0.1223 0.1227
One can also show that a decrease in the average intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ ≡ 1/θ raises the rate at which the ruler expropriates the ruled. Intuitively, as
the preference for growth becomes less pronounced, the desire to increase current at the
expense of future consumption leads to higher levels of µ and τ as the example in Table
4 suggests.
Table 4
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θ 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.1 1.2
τ 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.48
µ 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.30
Finally, simulation results reported in Table 5 illustrate the point that in economies
where public services are more eﬃcient (as measured by the elasticity parameter β ≡
d ln f (·)/d ln(G/Y )) the rulers choose to provide more of them. The Þnancing of such
services then requires a higher tax rate as well as a lower rate of retention of tax proceeds
for the ruler’s consumption.
Table 5
β
τ
µ

1/6 1/5 1/4 1/2
0.18 0.20 0.24 0.38
0.19 0.17 0.16 0.12

I now turn to the discussion of equilibrium in the case of a states system.

3.2

The States System (or Noblesse Oblige?)

Consider now an environment where households and rulers Þnd themselves distributed
over a number of states j (j ∈ {1, 2, .., M }). Initially, each state has N j ≥ N̄ inhabitants
and a ruler. Suppose that the cost of migration is low enough to allow movement of
households across the states; for simplicity assume that this cost ξ = 0.
Households that can move around within this state-system will choose to reside in
that state that oﬀers them the highest level of lifetime welfare. Rulers will, therefore,
have to compete to attract tax-paying subjects to ensure the continuing existence of a
tax base and the viability of their states and rule. What will be the equilibrium outcome
of the interaction of the M rulers and their subjects?
Given our bare-bones setup, the answer is straightforward and captures the essence of
the empire vs. state system argument. To see what is involved, note Þrst that each ruler
j’s strategy space Sj is given by Sj = [0, 1] × [0, 1] with a typical strategy sj = (τ j , µj ).
Given the payoﬀ functions Urj in (4) and M rulers, the game ΓM played by these rulers
is formally ΓM = [M, {Sj }, {Urj }]. The strategy proÞle s = (s1 , .., sM ) constitutes the
Nash equilibrium of the game ΓM if for every j = 1, ..., M , Urj (sj , s−j ) ≥ Urj (s0j , s−j ) for
all s0j ∈ Sj . It is straightforward to see that the Nash equilibrium of the game ΓM is that
each ruler will choose s̃j = (τ m , µm ) which ensures the maximum growth rate. To see
why, recall that the lifetime welfare of a household is maximized when the growth rate
is at its maximum (see (6)). If other rulers do not adopt the combination s̃j , the ruler
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that does will be able to attract the subjects of others to his state, thereby receiving a
payoﬀ higher than he would otherwise get. If other rulers adopt s̃j , a ruler that does
not loses all his subjects and earns a payoﬀ that is less than what he would earn had he
adopted s̃j . Note also that the growth rate maximizing tax rate is implicitly given by
(1 − τ m )f 0 (τ m ) = f (τ m ) and that competition among rulers results in µm = 0.
We have thus established that competition among rulers in a states system, where
subjects have the ability to move across jurisdictions, results in lower “tax” and, consequently, higher growth rates than would obtain in an empire. What do these results
imply for an interpretation of historical evidence concerning the “great divergence” between Europe and empires of the East?

Historical evidence is quite clear on the point that at times the latter achieved levels
of income and technological maturity that were at the global frontiers. The Chinese
example is unequivocal. Indian manufactures were for long periods of time the marvel of the world. The Ottoman empire achieved periods of prosperity and dynamism
and remained the main rival of the European powers for centuries. Europe, however,
eventually surpassed all others in terms of levels of income and technological progress.
Our results suggest one mechanism that would help explain the initial success and
later demise of the eastern empires, as well as the eventual rise of Europe. First, start by
noting that the ßedgling states that later became the eastern empires found themselves in
competition with other neighboring states. This competition, as predicted by the HumeWeber-Jones mechanism, also implied a competition for potential subjects in terms of
what the state would oﬀer. The Ottoman state, for instance, typically oﬀered lower
tax rates and provided security by putting an end to the power struggles among the
small principalities that devastated the Balkan and Anatolian cities and countryside
(see Inalcik, 2000). Similarly, as Akbar consolidated the Mughal empire by the conquest
of neighboring regions, he oﬀered peace, security, and relatively low taxes. It was during
the Song dynasty, which was in Þerce competition with other regional powers, that
China experienced its most spectacular technological advances and achieved high levels of
income. Once, however, these states succeeded in consolidating themselves into empires,
expropriation rates started rising inevitably. At the same time, the security to property
gradually eroded, with the ruling class extracting as much as it can from subjects trapped
in the vast empires. The result was a substantial decline in or cessation of economic
growth.
Europe, however, never experienced a similar development. Though there was some
consolidation, an empire unifying the European continental mass did not emerge. The
17

resulting state system gave rise to political competition among rulers for the tax-paying
subjects who found that it was not impossible, in the long-run, to move from one neighboring jurisdiction to another in search of better conditions. As a result expropriation
rates declined and rulers were gradually forced to oﬀer higher levels of “public services”.
Given this favorable environment, the sustained rise in the rate of capital accumulation
and economic growth eventually propelled Europe beyond the levels achieved by the
eastern empires.

4

Historical Evidence

In this section I discuss the historical evidence related to the Hume-Weber-Jones thesis.
In particular my objective is to provide evidence that (1) rulers in Europe competed
to attract a (historically speaking) relatively footloose population by oﬀering not only
better material conditions but also improved legal conditions that ensured lower expropriation rates; rulers in Eastern empires had means to move populations around
without having to oﬀer similar concessions; and (2) tax (expropriation) rates in Europe
were historically lower than those prevalent in the Eastern Empires.

4.1

Evidence on Mobility in Europe

Though it is clear that mobility in the medieval and the early modern periods remained
low in comparison to contemporary levels, recent demographic research has established
that in most parts of Europe there existed “a very considerable mobility arising out of
what one might call the normal circumstances of social and economic life” (Flinn, 1981,
p.69).28
Evidence of footloose European merchants, Þnanciers, and artisans moving across
jurisdictions in the period in question is abundant.29 The one that seems to fascinate
observers is that of Christopher Columbus shopping around, moving from court to court,
looking for Þnancial backers to an enterprise that would change the world. But, he was
not the only Italian who got around. Italian merchants were everywhere. Neither were
they the only ones. Dutch families—the de Geers, the Cronströms, the Blommaerts
28

Flinn (1981) surveys the demographic research on Europe in the early modern period (1500-1820).
Rösener (1992, 1994) summarizes the evidence for mobility for the Middle Ages (500-1500).
29
The ability of these groups to move and the consequences of such movements have been well-known
and understood by economists since at least Adam Smith (see the section below). For literature on this
see, among others, Braudel (1976) and de Vries (1984).

18

inter alia—settled in Sweden before the English started appearing in the 1670s; German
merchants dominated trade even in such small Finnish market towns like Viborg in the
17th century; printers wandered at random settling in one European town before moving
again; iron workers from Liege could be seen in Avelon in 1450; French artisans were
extensively employed in Spain in the1650s; Mirabeau was deeply concerned with the
French workmen’s readiness to emigrate (Braudel, 1979). Even when they did not move
Europeans could credibly threaten to exit. Thus, when the Spanish minister Olivares
demanded higher taxes in the name of the crown the Catalonian Cortes resisted. In
1640, the 9,000 troops brought into the province to enforce the crown’s claims led to a
popular rebellion and the Cortes called on Louis XIII of France to assume sovereignty
in Catalonia. In 1652 when a Spanish army Þnally reconquered Barcelona, Philip IV
granted amnesty and promised to respect the traditional liberties of Catalonia (see Tilly,
1990, p. 101).
Recent research also shows that in Europe even the traditionally immobile peasants
started to move once the changing economic and social conditions in the high Middle
Ages resulted in the dissolution of the manorial system. It is generally agreed that
though this process was uneven across Europe, it began in the eleventh century and
was almost complete by the late thirteenth century (Rösener, 1994). Peasants moved
establishing at times new settlements which were “often encouraged and supported by
lords who had a great interest in the enlargement of their arable land because this also
extended their territories and increased their revenues” (Rösener, 1992, p.37). Two
aspects of such mobility is signiÞcant for our purposes. First, peasants moved across
established borders. Second, they were attracted by rulers who oﬀered better material
conditions and favorable legal rights. It is useful to have a deeper look at the evidence
on peasant mobility in those earlier periods when such mobility is popularly considered
to be nonexisting.

High Middle Ages (950-1350) This period witnessed an economic expansion that
transformed the landscape of Central Europe from one of vast woodlands and marshes
into farmland. The “settlement movement” was sponsored largely by lay and ecclesiastic lords who attracted settlers from quite distant lands with promises of improved
conditions, that at times took the form of formal contracts. Thus, “[t]he development of
a number of Hufendoerfer in the marshes of the River Weser has been recorded in 1106
in a contract between Dutch peasants from Utrecht and Frederick, the Archbishop of
Bremen...Favorable property rights, low rents, and a far-reaching autonomy were for the
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most part suﬃcient means to attract an adequate number of volunteers for colonization
and settlement...[In Swabia] settlers enjoyed inheritance rights to their farms, and had
their own village court as well as the concession of Þxed rents and dues” (Rösener, 1992,
p. 38-39).
Similarly, “[t]he majority of settlers in the eastern regions came from the densely
inhabited north-western lands of the Empire, particularly the Low Countries, Westphalia, and eastern Saxony. They were lured by the prospect of larger holdings and
greater personal freedom, lower dues and an end labor services” (ibid., p.40).
To attract the settlers, lords in the new settlements had to oﬀer terms similar to
those being oﬀered elsewhere on the continent. Thus, “[t]he new villages in the east of
Germany took as their model the legal rights of independent peasantry which had been
established in assorted areas west of the Elbe and in particular in the Dutch settlements
along the marshes of the North Sea and its rivers....The better legal position of the
settlers eventually improved the condition of the indigenous population too: many Slav
villages came under German law (ius theutonicum), as a result of which peasants were
granted better property rights and adopted new agricultural techniques” (ibid., pp. 4041).
Mobility was not restricted to Central Europe either. “Clearings and the founding
of villages were not only carried out here [east of the Elbe and Saale] but also in the
neighboring Polish, Bohemian and Hungarian countries...In order to develop their land
and increase agrarian production, the eastern European nobility made great eﬀorts to
recruit experienced settlers from the west and the middle of Europe.” In Spain, recaptured Islamic territories, were recolonized in the thirteenth century. “The arable [land]
was then assigned to peasants on favorable legal and leasehold turns, at practice typical
for most clearing enterprises in medieval Europe” (ibid., p. 42).

Late Middle Ages (1350-1500) Despite popular misperceptions concerning the lot
of peasants under the feudal system the evidence suggests that “...greater and lesser
landlords displayed a notable lack of class solidarity in the manner in which they managed
their estates in the later fourteenth and Þfteenth centuries. They competed with each
other for tenants as well as laborers by taking in migrants and varying the rent packages
which they oﬀered. Employers repeatedly broke the statutes of laborers, but were rarely
Þned for paying excess wages; landlords whose oﬃcials took in the runaway villeins of
other lords were subject to no penalties; and little external assistance was made available
to lords to assist them in the recapture of their runaways. Because landlords lacked
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the willingness and capacity to act cohesively as a class, the potential for sustained
class conßict was lessened. In the slack land market which generally prevailed from the
closing decades of the fourteenth century onwards, most peasants seriously dissatisÞed
with their lot did not have to engage in protracted struggles with their lord: if better
terms were on oﬀer elsewhere they could simply move away” (Hatcher and Bailey, 2001,
p. 116). 30
Mobility, even when it was not legal was common: “Flight was a much stronger
weapon that any that landlords possessed. ‘Around 1400 on nearly all Ramsey [abbey]
manors, the trickle of the emigrants burst into a veritable ßood. The exodus was largely
illegal.’ [Raftis, 1964].31 In many west midlands villages three-quarters of the surnames
of the inhabitants changed every 40-60 years, as families died out and people moved
around in order to take advantage of the abundant opportunities furnished by the availability of land and work. In order to keep his lands as fully occupied as possible a lord
had to reach an accommodation with his tenants, since any attempt to restrain them
by force or to recapture runaways was ultimately futile” (Hatcher and Bailey, 2001, pp.
100-101). Emigrating peasants caused severe problems for the Teutonic knights in the
15th century (Tilly, 1990); peasants deserted the Paris region in the 14th century, and
came back to repopulate the region later (Braudel, 1979).
As a result “[i]f one surveys the legal status of Western and Central European ploughmen at the end of the Middle Ages, it becomes clear that the manifold attempts of feudal
lords to heighten rustic dependency were largely unsuccessful. The opportunities peasants had to emigrate, the role of towns, and various other factors impinged upon the
manor and frequently brought about a liberalization of the laws that applied to them”
(Rösener, 1994, p.81).
Early Modern Period (1500-1800) International mobility of European peasants
continued in the early modern period. In his inßuential survey Flinn (1981, p. 75) concludes that “[w]ithout doubt research into migratory movements, particularly, research
employing quantitative methods, will continue; but enough has already been done to
indicate that mobility was a very widespread characteristic of the early modern period.”
Instances of such mobility are everywhere to be seen. “During the sixteenth century
the eastern parts of Central Europe also experienced a new wave of land clearance and
30

Brenner (1997, p.16) points out that “...under feudalism lords always took a surplus in some sense
individually—rather than collectively via some sort of centralized taxation—and consequently they always
faced the problem of implicit competition among lords for peasants.”
31
See also Raftis (1997).
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colonization. It was a process characterized by a variety of individual developments,
each independent of the others. Lithuanian peasants moved into northern East Prussia.
Dutch marsh farmers—Mennonites who left their home country for religious reasons—
emigrated to the region at the mouth of the Vistula...Polish manorial lords were quick
to draw upon the services of the expert Dutch colonists: villages founded by them could
be found everywhere in the low country of the Vistula....The outlying spurs of these various individual population movements, resulting from the powerful demographic growth
to the west, extended across West Prussia and Poznan as far as central Poland and
Volhynia” (Rösener, 1994, p. 129). “Nadal and Giralt have traced the very considerable
movement of French migrants from the central Pyrenees and the western side of the
Massif Central through to Spain. It was a stream that reached its maximum ßow in the
middle and later sixteenth century. Between 1570 and 1620 from 10 per cent to 20 percent of the male population of Catalonia was of French origin...On a larger scale, Chaunu
has described the colonization from 1766 of the Sierra Morena of southern Spain by several thousand Germans to open on land deserted since the thirteenth century...After
the Seven Years War an estimated eleven thousand German families—mainly those of
discharged soldiers, supplemented by others from Lorraine, Belgium, and Italy—settled
in the Banat area of present-day Hungary and Romania” (Flinn, 1981, pp.70-731).
Migrants were attracted by rulers who promised them not only better economic
conditions but also improved legal rights. Thus, “[o]nly after the treaty of Passarowitz
(Pozarevac) in 1718, according to which the Banat became a Habsburg crown domain,
did a major wave of colonization begin; it reached its peak under Empress Maria Theresa
a few decades later. It was not just Germans who arrived. Other nationalities were
also persuaded to settle in what would turn into turned into the bread basket of the
Balkans.. The immigrants came from Swabia, the Palatinate and even from as far away
as Lorraine. They were personally free and given their farms on a hereditary basis.
The same strategy was applied in Galicia and Bukovina. At almost the same time-the
end of the Seven Years War (1763)-Tsarina Catherine the Great issued an invitation to
participate in the resettlement of Russia. Newcomers would receive their farms free of
dues for thirty years; they could continue to practice their own religion; and they would
enjoy full rights of self-government. The imperial proclamation evoked a powerful
response, particularly in certain German territorial states” (Rösener, 1994, p. 132).32
32

It is instructive to note that wherever circumstances enabled rulers to impede mobility, the long-run
economic consequences of doing so proved to be debilitating. Thus, in the early modern period, “[t]he
economic crisis faced by the towns gave the [Eastern European] nobility, helped by its close links to
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4.2

Mobility in Eastern Empires

Rulers of Eastern Empires were not averse to attracting tax-payers from outside their
borders. But since they were not in competition with others in a state system they were
not compelled to oﬀer better property or political rights to potential immigrants. They
were also able to use coercive measures more successfully to retain the existing taxpayers
within their empires.
Ottomans, for instance, eager to attract a larger taxbase welcomed Jews and Moriscos
expelled from Spain, Portugal, and Italy, as well as refugees ßeeing from Russian invasions of the Caucasus. But these were of course instances where the push from the
country of emigration was the decisive factor. The Ottoman state did at times oﬀer
lower taxes for a limited time to attract settlers, but oﬀered neither improved legal conditions nor property rights on land settled since all land belonged to the Sultan. It is
thus not surprising that “...the number of actual settlers who voluntarily came seeking
economic opportunity seems to have been quite small” (Quataert, 1994, p. 794). Typically, like the Byzantines before them, Ottomans used forced deportations to colonize
areas that were important to state. Thus, “[a] large scale colonization occurred under
Mehmed II when he deported en masse peasants from newly conquered lands of Serbia and the Morea, and Turcoman nomads to the villages around Istanbul which had
lost their Greek population during the siege of Constantinople” (Inalcik, 1994, p.32).
Similarly, when peasants deserted their Anatolian villages during the upheaval caused
by Celali bands in the period 1596-1610, “...the government took drastic measures to
ensure the return of these peasants ” (ibid., p. 32).
The Chinese state also promoted population movements insofar as they resulted in
the formation of communities on the existing model with the same rights and obligations to the state. Thus, the “Chinese state ...when convinced no serious social problems
between immigrants and natives would occur, encouraged migration to form new settlements so that populations and resource bases remained in relative balance...State eﬀorts
in these three general areas supported a range of economic situations, at the end points
of which were two distinct types of agrarian economy: a series of small-scale, largely
the monarchy, the chance to break the bourgeois monopoly of foreign and domestic trade, to prohibit
cities from granting asylum to runaway serfs, to outwit the burghers in commercial transactions and to
secure price advantages for its own products by virtue of tariﬀ reductions. Weakened by the measures
rammed through diets by princes and noblemen, many Eastern European cities began to stagnate...
This trend was accompanied by stagnating and in some instances declining productivity. Under such
conditions peasant farming made little progress or even fell behind.” (ibid., pp. 111-113)
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self-suﬃcient economies reproduced across an expanding empire; and a complex, largescale interdependent economy to be monitored and if necessary managed by the state
to achieve social stability.” (Wong 2000, p. 453).

4.3

Burden of Taxation/Expropriation

I now turn to a brief discussion of the evidence concerning the relative rates of taxation/expropriation in Europe and the Eastern Empires.
Surveys of the extensive literature on the economic history of the Ottoman and
Mughal empires are unequivocal in their conclusions concerning the high rates of taxation
and expropriation these imposed on their subjects at their zenith. For instance, using
the numbers from the budget for Egypt (which is the only part of the Ottoman Empire
for which a complete budget for the sixteenth century has been preserved), Goldsmith
(1987, p 92) estimates that “...the overall burden of taxation is not likely to have been
below one-third of the province’s total income and may well have approached one-half
when the numerous semilegal and extralegal levies of the authorities and of tax farmers
are taken into account.” As a result, in the Ottoman Empire: “...the revenue of the
fully 1.5 percent of householders represented by the sultan, governors, and holders of
large Þefs of over 350 million akches would have represented about one-third of total
agricultural revenue. Even if the latter should have been as high as 1.5 billion akches
the share of the top 1.5 percent of rural income recipients would still have been as
high as one-fourth” (ibid., p. 85). Faroqhi (1994) points out that throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottoman state placed its wealthy merchants
and craftsmen under the strict control of its ‘political class’ which siphoned oﬀ wealth
from the former through various means, including administered prices, illegal taxation,
bribes, and outright expropriation. A telling example is the fate of Michael Cantacuzenus
who grew immensely wealthy playing the Fugger to the Ottomans. Cantacuzenus was
hanged on 13th March, 1578, on the orders of the sultan, without a trial, “from the gates
of his own palace at Anchioli and his wealth was conÞscated” (Braudel, 1976, p. 696).
His was not an isolated case. “Under the Ottoman system, neither the towns nor anyone
in them could expect the kind of security from interference which would encourage the
technical experimentation, and the study of nature which were among the springs of
growing power in the West” (McGowan, 1994).
Similarly, “[t]he Mughal state was an insatiable leviathan: its impact on the economy was deÞned above all by its unlimited appetite for resources” (Raychaudhuri, 1982,
p. 173). Mughal merchants lived in fear, being constantly subjected to extortion, the
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forms of which “...ranged from straightforward plunder to ostensibly legitimate taxation.”33 The testimony of the Jain merchant Banarasidas is particularly telling. He
writes of “jewellers being thrashed with ‘thorny whips’ by the jāgirdār of Jaunpar
who demanded ‘what they did not have’.”34 Goldsmith (1987, p.122) estimates that the
burden of the imperial government of India at the time of Akbar “...was of well over one
Þfth of the national product, excluding and fully one-fourth including the zamindars’
charges on the peasants.” The result was that “...the emperor [Akbar] and the 122 top
ranking nobles—something like 6 · 10−6 of all 22 million households—received on a gross
basis nearly one-eighth of total national product” (ibid., p. 106). It is also useful to
note that “[t]he emperor had in addition a substantial income from the escheat of all
estates left by nobles, or by such wealthy commoners as he chose, except wives’ jewelry
and what assets the decedent might have managed to hide, although the emperor might
grant a small proportion to the heirs. The discouraging eﬀects on saving and investment
of this policy are obvious” (ibid., p.121)
As for China the evidence suggests that though the legal tax rates were not high, ofÞcials succeeded in expropriating much higher amounts through extra-legal means.Mote
(1999, p.908) points out that “...the basic taxes were remarkably low...it has been calculated that the land tax took only 5 to 6 percent of the annual harvest of the principal
cereal crops...The Qing tax system (like the Ming before it) thus left much of the surplus
over subsistence in agricultural production to be consumed in the provinces...It seems
probable that a substantial amount of that surplus was taken illicitly from the producers by various other means...” Chaudhuri (1990, p. 89) suggests that the Chinese state
“...claimed a Þfth or more of the total agricultural production as its share of income... ”
It has been calculated that by the eighteenth century the Chinese elite extracted a high
fraction of the agricultural output in the Yangzi delta: “At the same time...these landlords had consolidated their ownership of the land and thereby their ability to take what
was an essentially politically set level of rent, which, in the Yangzi delta, amounted to
40 to50 percent of the summer harvest—rice in the paddy zone and cotton in the cotton
belt (Bernhardt 1992, 21). Since the burden of the taxes had been shifted onto property
owners, and rentier landlords paid their taxes out of the rent receipts, the Qing state
upheld and enforced the right of lanlords to garner rents from their tenants (Huang 1990,
42; 1996, 81; Bernhardt 1992, 13, 30; Jing 1994, 66-67; Mazumdar 1998, 214-16). In the
Yangzi delta, the Chinese elite was thus able to extract roughly 30 to 40 percent of the
33
34

ibid. p. 186.
ibid. p.186. For similar observations and conclusions on Mughal India see also Rothermund (1993).
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annual agricultural output (Huang 1990, 103)” (Brenner and Isett, 2002, 615). Furthermore, “...the state and legal traditions discouraged the accumulation of capital in the
hands of merchants and repeated attempts were made to break up the concentrations
of Þnancial power within selected groups” (Chaudhuri, 1990, p. 386). “In China, the
bureaucracy lay across the top of Chinese society is a single, virtually unbreachable stratum; any damage was spontaneously repaired...Local [Cantonese] mandarins practiced
corruption as a matter of course, and grew rich with few pangs of conscience...[But] this
was merely an accumulation that died with its owner, the reward of oﬃce...Neither the
fortune nor the power of the mandarins was passed on smoothly to create dynasties of
dominant families” (Braudel, 1979, p. 595).35 Unlike the cities in Europe “[t]he [Chinese]
city had nothing like a city charter, and no independent administration;... no laws and
privileges that applied especially to its inhabitants; and no indigenous social groups that
would have thought of demanding city dwellers’ “rights” from the central government.
In short, Chinese cities had no separate legal or political status; they were not corporate
entities and had none of the organizational features that set European cities apart...[The]
Chinese city did not make people free in speciÞc political and legal senses...” (Mote pp.
761-62). Moreover, “[t]he emergence of capitalism necessarily also depended on the expansion of the judiciary system to deÞne the conditions under which private enterprise
can grow; it has also required that economic interests be given relatively free rein to
develop and that government allow rational implementation of business operations free
of excessive interference. None of these conditions was being met in the late Ming and
early Qing; there is no visible trend in that direction” (ibid., p. 769). Wong (2002, p.
455) is explicit as to the reasons: “Irrespective of the particular institutional mechanisms
deployed by a particular European country’s merchants, all held a fundamental belief
that state and merchant shared a common interest in exploiting economic opportunities.
European notions of a merchant empire were absent from Chinese thinking not because
the Chinese state was too weak to consider such an alliance between government and
merchant but because it was too strong and successful in other ways to have reason
to consider practices that would bring it revenue that it did not anxiously desire and
potential problems it did not really want.” And “[t]he Chinese political economy was
not ‘mercantilist’ since its policymakers did not conceive of themselves as competing for
wealth and power with other like-minded governments” (ibid., p. 460).
It is also instructive to contrast brießy the picture that emerges for the eastern
empires with that of two European countries lying on the high (United Provinces) and
35

See also Fairbank (1957, 1980) and Perkins (1967).
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low (England) ends of the tax spectrum. The government of the former recovering from
its long struggle with Spain had total government revenues in 1688 at one-fourth of the
national product. The same ratio for Great Britain at the end of the seventeenth century
was about 3 percent (Goldsmith, 1987). It is also useful to note that “[i]n England in
1688 the complete share of the top 136 families (temporal lords) was slightly above 2
percent” (ibid., p. 108).

5

Alternative Hypotheses

I now turn to a brief discussion of alternative hypotheses concerning the causes of the
“great divergence.”

5.1

“Culture Makes Almost All the Diﬀerence”

The title of David Landes’ article in Culture Matters boldly declares the gist of this view:
“Culture Makes Almost All the Diﬀerence”.36 Diﬀerential economic performance, this
view holds, can mostly be attributed to diﬀerent cultural values. The rise of Europe is to
be explained by the “protestant ethic”. The spectacular performance of the “dragons”
of East Asia owe much to their Confucian values etc.
A number of objections have been raised to this view. The Þrst one, recognized by
Landes, is that having the same culture does not lead to similar economic outcomes. For
example, while mainland China and some of the “dragons” share the same “Confucian
values”, their development experience up to recent times have been quite diﬀerent. One
can also point out that the values that are now praised as promoting development were
once condemned as blocking it. A typical retort to these criticisms is to argue, as Landes
does, that “determinants of complex processes are invariably plural and interrelated”
and “with policies that now encourage rather than suppress economic development”
diﬀerences in economic performance of those in possession of the right cultural values
will disappear (see Landes, 2000, p.2-3). This argument, however, leaves one wondering
why then it is the case that it is “culture that makes almost all the diﬀerence” and not
“policies that encourage economic development”?
A second objection to the view that privileges culture points out that “cultures are
extremely contingent phenomena” (Jones, 2002, p.25). They respond to changes in eco36

See Landes (2000). Landes’ booklength treatment of world economic history draws the same conclusion (see Landes, 1998).
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nomic and political conditions. The Ottoman Empire in its expansionary phase actively
encouraged innovation, adopting the most advanced military technologies, attracting
“many a talented Greek, Jew, and Gentile into the sultan’s service” (Kennedy, 1989, p.
11), with Ottoman muslim traders engaging in international trade, travelling throughout Europe. A century later, we see the Ottomans disinterested in technical advances
and the muslim traders being replaced by their christian Ottoman counterparts. Similar vacillations occur in India and China. Do we then conclude that there are major
widespread cultural switches from progressive to conservative, and, if so, what accounts
for such switches?
A third and Þnal point is that a culture is never a homogeneous, self-consistent
entity. It typically has elements that can be used to support diﬀerent and at times even
contradictory attitudes. All the evidence is that the Ottomans, the Mughal Indians, or
the Confucian Chinese did not feel themselves betraying their culture when there was a
shift in attitudes. To suppose that a culture endows its practitioners with a unique set
of unchanging attitudes or inner values is simply to ignore history.

5.2

“Chance Events” of the World-Historians

An alternative view of why Europe diverged particularly from China, is associated with
the recent writings of a group of authors collectively called the world-historians (see
Goldstone, 2000, Pomeranz, 2000, and Wong, 1997).37 Though the authors diﬀer in
particulars, their common theme is that while China and Europe had economies more
or less at par probably until the eighteenth or even the nineteenth centuries, some
chance event led to the “great divergence”. The chance event is sometimes said to
be the European discovery of the steam engine that turned coal into energy at rates
unimaginable before. Other favorite candidates for the chance events are the geographic
good fortune of having coal nearby in mines were cheap to operate and the European
discovery of the New World that relaxed the resource constraints of northwest Europe. It
has also been suggested that had William III’s invasion of England failed, Europe might
not have risen to world economic and political dominance. Europe’s earlier experiences
and its structural diﬀerence from, say China, are consistently downplayed by the worldhistorians.
In response one could point out that many European countries that, like China, did
not have access to cheap coal did in fact manage to industrialize quite early and did
37

A useful summary of this view is to be found in Stokes (2001), Pomeranz (2002), and Wong (2002).

28

also diverge from China. What made the diﬀerence was the ability of these economies
to adopt the new technologies developed elsewhere. This was, in turn, the consequence
of the gradual but persistent accumulation of wealth made possible by the political
structure that had evolved in Europe.38

5.3

“Resource Grab”

This thesis credits the European rise to dominance to its grab of resources, gold, silver,
and land, from the indigenous inhabitants of the New World. As the most recent proponent of this view, Frank (1998) sharply puts it, “Europeans did not do anything—let
alone modernize—by themselves.” “The Europeans had no exceptional, let alone superior, ethnic, rational, organizational, or spirit-of-capitalist advantages to oﬀer, diﬀuse, or
do anything else in Asia” (Frank, 1998, p. 5, 284). Frank claims that with the price of
silver being almost twice as high in China as in Europe, Europeans traded the silver they
plundered in the New World for the goods produced in China, thus buying themselves
“a seat, and then even a whole railway car, on the Asian train” (Frank, 1998, p. 277).
One should then question the supposed destination of this Asian train. It is one
thing to agree that the resources seized by Europe in the New World partially fueled
the European expansion.39 It is another thing, however, to accept the view that had
the Asian empires been the recipient of a similar windfall, the outcome in terms of
technological breakthroughs or of rapid sustained increases in income would have been
similar. Given what we know of the political and economic conditions prevailing in
Asia at the time, it is very diﬃcult to imagine a similar economic dynamic arising in
the eastern part of the Eurasian continental mass. The good fortune of Europe was
the political circumstances that had prepared on the ground a “stock of institutions”
enabling its inhabitants, through perhaps no fault of their own, to take advantage of the
windfall.40
38

In criticizing Pomeranz, Brenner and Isett (2002) argue that between 1500 and 1750 the developmental paths of England and the Yangzi delta of China had already taken them on to very diﬀerent
trajectories and levels of income. This, according to Brenner was essentially because of the shift in the
“social-property” relations in England that put an end to “coercive extraction” from peasants.
39
Findlay (1992) suggests that the New World was not only a source of “enormous resources” for
Europe but it also provided a “Great Frontier” to be opened up as a market, a destination for investments
as well as migrants. Bairoch (1993) disputes the importance of “third-world” raw materials and markets
and colonialism, in general, as being crucial to European industrialization
40
In a recent paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002b) point out to the role of colonialism
and Atlantic trade in strengthening the commercial bourgeoisie and giving them the leverage to develop
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6

A Brief Intellectual History

The basic idea that political fragmentation somehow provides a fertile ground for “economic progress” seems to have recently gained widespread currency. Though not every
author is clear about the nature of the links that connect political fragmentation to economic success, it is useful Þrst to elucidate several alternative mechanisms that have been
suggested as possible links. One mechanism is the one formalized in this paper. Political
fragmentation, by allowing the subjects to move across jurisdictions more easily, leads
to competition among rulers for the mobile tax-base, lowering rates of expropriation and
increasing the amount of public services provided. A second mechanism, formalized in
Garner and Chaudhry (2001), emphasizes the idea that political competition in a system with many rulers and states makes it more diﬃcult to suppress innovations (which
may threaten the political power of incumbents) because those rulers who fail to innovate may fall prey to neighboring predators who do innovate.41 These two mechanisms
are sometimes joined together as in everyone’s favorite story of that famous innovator
Christopher Columbus shopping around, touring Europe, going from the Italian citystates to the Duke of Anjou in France, then to the king of Portugal, then to the duke
of Medina-Sedonia, then to the count of Medina-Celi, and Þnally to the king and queen
of Spain only to be rejected the Þrst time and to be granted the resources he has been
asking for only at appeal (see Kennedy, 1987 and Diamond, 1999).
In addition to these mechanisms, it is useful to note the sometimes explicit but
mostly implicit connection the literature makes between the use of political power and its
economic consequences. Terms like “tyranny” and “despotism” common in the historical
and political science literature are typically employed in the sense that the rule being
referred to is that of an absolute sovereign whose actions are arbitrary and “unjust.”
However, especially when used in the context of an economic-historical analysis, the
terms also imply an arbitrary loss or diminution of the security of the property rights.
Recent literature (see Kennedy, 1987, Mokyr, 1990, and Diamond, 1999, among
further the instutions that protected their property rights.
41
The innovations in question may be purely civilian in their use or may involve military technologies.
In the former case it is the fear that the innovators may use their increased economic power to obtain
political power, which, in turn, can be used to wrestle political power away from the incumbent. This is
to be feared because political power enables its holder to extract resources from others (see Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2002a). Balanced against this should be the threat posed by foreign rulers who command
superior resources because of having successfully innovated (Garner and Chaudhry, 2001). In the case
of military innovations, the risk run by those rulers who fail to adapt would be losing their possessions
to others who do (see Findlay, 1992).
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others) typically traces both of these mechanisms back to Jones (1981), who in turn
credits jointly Wallerstein (1974) and Wesson (1967, 1978). Wesson emphasizes the
beneÞts of the states system and documents the “failings of the imperial alternative.”
Wallerstein (1974) points out that in the sixteenth century the fate of the European
economic development depended crucially on the transnational economic system and
the failure of attempts to restore a European empire. For Wallerstein the mechanism at
play seems to be a version of the combination of the two mechanisms identiÞed above:
his emphasis is on the lack of political power of the “commercial-urban middle stratum”
in China which made them “constantly vulnerable to conÞscatory measures whenever
their economic proÞts become suﬃciently swollen so that they might begin to create for
themselves military strength” (Wallerstein, 1979, pp. 22-23). It was the good fortune of
Europe to escape a similar fate that might have befallen it had the Habsburg dream of
a “universal monarchy” materialized.
However, understanding of the mechanisms in question certainly does go farther
back in time than the last decades of the twentieth century, for we Þnd a version of it
in Hume42 (1998, pp. 63-65) whose essay ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and
Sciences’, Þrst published in 1741 (italics in the original)43 :

“That nothing is more favorable to the rise of politeness and learning, than
a number of neighboring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy. The emulation which naturally arises among those neighboring states is an obvious source of improvement. But what I would chießy
insist on is the stop which such limited territories give both to power and to
authority.”
“Extended governments, where a single person has great inßuence, soon become absolute; but small ones change naturally into commonwealths. A
large government is accustomed by degrees to tyranny...[A] large government, though the whole may be discontented, may, by a little art, be kept in
obedience...”
42

One can, with some anachronism, trace the germ of the idea even to Herodotus (c. 490-425 BC).
The writer of the bookjacket for his Histories seems to do exactly this when he writes that “Its [i.e. that
of the Histories] main theme is the heroic and successful struggle of a small and divided Greece against
the mighty empire of Persia—with its underlying conßict between the absolutism of the East and the
free institutions of the West” (Herodotus, 1985).
43
I owe the reference to Hume to Enrico Spolaore who pointed it out in a private conversation.
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“But the division into small states are favourable to learning, by stopping
the progress of authority as well as that of power.”
“Each [Greek] city produced its several artists and philosophers, who refused
to yield the preference to those of the neighbouring republics;...and the sciences, not being dwarfed by the restraint of authority, were enabled to make
such considerable shoots as are even at this time the objects of our admiration....But mankind having at length thrown oﬀ this yoke, aﬀairs are now
returned nearly to the same situation as before, and EUROPE is at present
a copy, at large, of what GREECE was formerly a pattern in miniature.”44
At about the same time, in his Spirit of the Laws published in 1748, Montesquieu
was expounding a political theory that sharply distinguished “Oriental despotism” from
the prevailing European political system and extolled the role of the mobility of capital
in Europe (achieved through the invention and increasing use of the letter of exchange)
in curbing the power of the sovereign:
“They invented letters of exchange, in this way commerce was able to avoid violence
and maintain itself everywhere, for the richest trader had only invisible goods, which
could be sent everywhere and leave no trace anywhere...Since that time princes had to
govern themselves more wisely than they themselves would have thought, for it turned
out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known
that only goodness of government brings prosperity” (Montesquieu, 1989, p. 389).45
Furthermore, Montesquieu connects political liberty, which he deÞnes as consisting
in “security or in one’s opinion of one’s security,”46 to wealth accumulation, predation,
and “defensive action”: “As for the despotic state, it is useless to talk about it. General
44

Hume also has a geographical explanation that predates the modern account given in Diamond
(1999) for the political fragmentation of Europe:
“If we consider the face of the globe, EUROPE, of all the four parts of the words, is the
most broken by seas, rivers, and mountains, and GREECE of all countries of EUROPE.
Hence these regions were naturally divided into several distinct governments; and hence the
sciences arose in GREECE and EUROPE has been hitherto the most constant habitation
of them” (See Hume 1998, pp. 65-66).
45

Like Hume, Montesquieu also provided a geographical explanation to account for the diﬀerent
systems observed in Europe and Asia (see Montesquieu, 1989, pp. 283-284).
46
Ibid., p.187.
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rule: in a nation that is in servitude, one works more to preserve than to acquire; in a
free nation, one works more to acquire than to preserve” (ibid., p. 341).4748
Montesquieu’s contemporary Adam Smith echoed several of the themes already encountered. First, Smith emphasized the importance of “the liberty and security of
individuals,” noting that it was because of this security in the cities that industry ßourished and “stock accumulated” there before the country. Smith argued that cities in
France and England were given their freedom as a consequence of the political competition between the sovereign and feudal lords. As he put it “[t]he burghers naturally
hated and feared the lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though perhaps
he might despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual interest,
therefore, disposed them to support the king, and the king to support them against the
lords. They were the enemies of his enemies, and it was his interest to render them as
secure and independent of those enemies as he could” (2000, p. 430).
Second, Smith, like Montesquieu recognized that mobility of the “capital stock”
reduced the ability of the sovereign to tax it:
“The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily
attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which
he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a burdensome tax,
47

However, Montesquieu also writes: “Taxes should be very light in despotic government. Otherwise,
who would want to take the trouble to cultivate the land? Moreover, how can high taxes be paid in
a government that does nothing to replace what the subject has given?” (ibid., p. 219). One way
to interpret this in light of our results is to suggest that the eastern empires provided relatively little
public services as compared to the taxes they collected, however low these may be in absolute terms.
48
Similar sentiments were voiced in the debate over the ratiÞcation of the US constitution of 1787.
Those who were opposed to ratiÞcation, known as the Antifederalists, were concerned with the powers
to be given to the federal government to the detriment of individual states. They believed that a
“consolidated” republic would eventually lead to despotism with its power to levy taxes directly upon
individuals. Under the then-existing Articles of Confederation, the Congress had only the authority to
make requisitions from states without actually having any real power to force payment (see Kenyon,
1966). Antifederalists extolled the virtues of each state choosing its own level and kind of taxes and
feared the “tyranny” of uniform federal taxes. As “Philadelphiensis” put it in his letter of March 8,
1788 in the Independent Gazetteer of Philadelphia “[t]he truth of this matter is simply this: the taxes
will hereafter be uniform in all the states, and as oppressive as tyranny can make them. In every state
the face of the poor must be ground to dust; and where any appearance of prosperity or wealth is
observed, an additional tax will be devised” (Kenyon, 1966, p.83). They also did not shy away from
comparing the feared tyranny of the proposed federal government with the despotism of the “oriental
empires”. In this, as in other areas, antifederalists were inßuenced by Montesquieu whose name carried
great weight and was cited frequently.
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and would remove his stock to some other country where he could either carry on his
business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease. ...A tax which tended to drive away stock
from any particular country, would so far tend to dry up every source of revenue, both to
the sovereign and to the society...The nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax
the revenue arising from stock, instead of any severe inquisition of this kind, have been
obliged to content themselves with some very loose...estimation” (Smith, 2000, p.914).49
Finally, Adam Smith also put forward another aspect of the modern idea when he emphasized the diﬀerence between Asian and European economies. The former, suggested
Smith, were dominated by agriculture supported by “hydraulic works” constructed by
the oriental states. The latter nations favored manufactures and foreign trade (Smith,
2000). This stress on the role of public services provided by the state was an integral
part of a line of argument developed by Marx and Engels into the notion of an “Asiatic
mode of production” and found its exaggerated culmination in the Oriental Despotism
of Karl Wittfogel (1957).50
We owe the Þrst lucid twentieth century expression of the mechanism to Weber who
in his monumental Economy and Society (Þrst published in 1922) writes (italics in the
original):
“The privileges of private capital in patrimonial states were always the more
developed, the more the power competition of several states made it necessary for them to woo the mobile money capital. Politically privileged capitalism ßourished in Antiquity, as longest several states fought for ascendancy
and survival; in China, too, it seems to have developed in the corresponding
past. It ßourished during the age of mercantilism in the Occident, when
the modern power states entered upon their political competition. It disappeared in the Roman Empire when the latter became a universal state and
merely had to protect frontiers; it was almost completely absent in the Chinese Empire, and relatively weak in the Oriental and Hellenistic states—the
weaker, the more these states were “universal”—and also in the Caliphate.
Of course, not every competition for power led to privileges for capital; this
could only happen when capital formation was already underway. Conversely, paciÞcation and the resulting decline of political demands for capital
on the part of the great universal states eliminated the privileged position of
49

Hirschman (1981) cites Montesquieu and Smith and adds Sir James Steuart (1767) to the list of
early authors who celebrated the possible exit of capital as a restraint on arbitrary government.
50
See Anderson (1979) for a discussion of the intellectual history of the Asiatic mode of production.
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capital” (Weber, 1968, p. 1103).

Here we have all the elements necessary for the proper functioning of the mechanism
clearly outlined: several states in competition and mobile capital forcing rulers to attract
capital by granting it “privileges”. On the other hand, the absence of competition
among states, as would be the case the more “universal” the state is, eliminates the
need to attract capital by providing privileges. Weber does not specify the “privileges”
its “exit” possibilities procured for mobile capital. One can however, in light of our
discussion, suggest that these included lower expropriation rates, protected in the longrun by political “voice” and formalized rights that, as Wallerstein and Jones point out,
were conspicuously absent in the empires of the East, where “exit” was either a limited
or a non-existent option.

7

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I built a simple model which illustrates the Hume-Weber-Jones mechanism
for the rise of Europe and the demise of the eastern empires. The mechanism is one where
political competition in a states system leads rulers to expropriate less and to provide
relatively more public services to their footloose subjects. Rulers who do not face such
competition would be more likely to choose higher expropriation rates relative to what
they provide in return. The Song Chinese, and the Ottoman and Mughal Indian states
in their consolidation periods did in fact face such competition and chose to expropriate
less from their subjects leading to their “golden periods”. However, their consolidation
into uniÞed, stable empires radically diminished the potential mobility of their subjects
and removed a structural barrier to high levels of expropriation. The resulting fall in
rates of capital accumulation and growth led these empires into a long period of decline.
Europe, however, was fortunate in avoiding uniÞcation and consolidation into empire.
The states system that emerged there led to political competition among its rulers to
keep and expand a tax base composed of subjects that could, in the long run, move
from one state to another in search of lower rates of expropriation and higher levels of
“public services”. The economic and political privileges won by the footloose subjects
translated into higher rates of capital accumulation and economic growth that propelled
the rise of Europe.
35
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